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1 
G ;ID:MY AID THE INITIATIVE FOR P~.ACE. 
1 r . President: Several days ago I shared with the Senate some 
reflections on the Big Four Conference wnich is soon to open in 
Geneva . In substance I said that the President and the Secretary 
of st te \orould be able to negotiate with str(;ngth and conviction 
if they \'rent into th~Geneva meetings 11i th the united support of the 
' 
nation. 
~here is no reason w y they vhould not h;ve t~~t support . Our 
participation in the Conference does not bear 8 party label . It 
. 1 . 1 d 1 t f 1· . r1 ,&~ Th 
l.S a Ogl.ca eve opmen o po l.Cl.es ~m'.lny years ~ ey 
began with a Republican Congress and a Democr~tic Adminicitr tion. 
'l'ney are bearing fruit l-Tith a Decocratic Congress and a Republican 
Administration. 
Shou d the Geneva Conference move the world closer to a desirable 
pe ce, it rrill be largely because # -c •• e sacrifices i'Thich ~ all 
Americans have made over the past decade will ~ ~c ~'?mdwork 
for a ouccessful conference. It wil be because for ten years this 
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pro cto for r licving world t 
~ 
io , till(.~ d th c 
.J4. 
to 
itle f int ti 1 life. G-J 
.-r o doing he rcawak ned our f ith in our clvc d i our 
1 d r.: :dp. He h: s re:oinded u.s of our cnonnous c1.ty, w en 
~ 
nr united, to dcn.l with the pr blems of p co no les s t n t e 
~ 
of wur . 
n the Austrian TrC3ty we have had tho fil t ev1.dcncc t t 
t!:i,.;. :;t 2 J$.4 et_ l"'ie ef t!.c • uoe <L M!J 'k h 1(.1!!1 RA 1;14~ 
/7~*~· ~~-)~~~ 
~COOcl?-t 0~ Of r t l.n !lTOpC. }4 Ob ...... f!laJ:i C 
~ 0.. ~~ v--.Lu ;£..." 
fj t \ f ¥_ f\ t t the r..adow of tot bo de 
to r cedo w1. t out bo bs ben t e will t fr edom i uny elding d 
th utr ngth to uUSt in it is ado 
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The Austrian trl;8t'J is a co promise as are all bloodless 
~cttlements . For our part, the treaty ic satisfactory because in 
the judgment of the President , the Secretary of Jt te and the 
Senate it serves the peaceful purposes of the nati n an~s acceptib~e 
to the Austrian people . 
~ Jt. ... ~ 0 _,.._. N ...... '"' 
~ a;).109 il gh ito mo•s 'baQk an advanced position \ 
~ .h. 1*'4-H'J... J..c..k.. ~  ~ ~ . 
--~ 
in It/e. tern ~urope/\~ may be a prelude to of Rus ian military pm·rer 
J.,-J..A_ 
If the Austrian Treaty serves our ~es, holrever, we must 
face the fact that the Russians believe it :;:-rves theirs 'lS \':ell . I f 
~£~ 
they did not , it would not have been signed. )!l th< t perspective, 
1\. 
the Austri n treaty becomes one of a series of n&pja ai highly 
significant moves l-Thich have character ized Soyiet policy in recent 
months . Why. we may i·tell ask ourselves , have the Russians renounced 
their treaties of reciprocal assist~nce with }~ance and the mited 
Kingdom which ·,;ere directed against Ge~ militarism? Hhy have they 
shown a more amenable attitude on disarmament lhy did the leo.d<Jrs 
of the Soviet nion pay Mmage to 1< arshall Ti to in Belgr de" Ho"r are 
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in may judgment, is mere prelude. The real drive is now only 
beginning to unfold ~d i% pea b t:e.s t rs Cbhf: ng in h!IIXA" e T4rtz o' t s (... 
J;: will probe for weaknesses in every part of the structure ~x 
peace ,.,hich together •·Ti th other nations we have bu.l t over the 
past decade and on which rest s the future of vlestern civilization 
end 
' 
the X£l!Dix S~curity of this count~ . !(.. r ~ '1 
~ V'- ~~.,~· 
For many years , it has be ... n apparent that Gennany t-~ould 
~ 
recover and would become once again • decisive 'OO'tTCr in Europe , the . . ,._ . 
~ _.tu.. .. !_.. fN" .Je-t~ ... ~ A., ,._J.~ 
pivot on "'hich the questiolt> of war or peace 'I'TOula OftCSa&411 t urn. 
1\.-
In 1949, I visited Germany and reported to the House Foreign Affairs 
Co::nmi ttee that 
Although Ge~3ny is at the present time in a very 
weak position •ri th t ro sepur te governments .•. it is 
potentially the str wngest nation in Western Europe ••• 
Germany is the big prize ••• 
,vtv -Jl.(; ~ ~ri'Q-
.i!.'ven na J ens gs 7'1!t(J tho Soviet Jnion was atte pting to 
~ wt.~ ob ..,-
draw~rmany away from Western Europe . l'!aot"'*au -,., \ he Soviet ;nion ~ 
already reco~1izcd that unification was the one gre. ~tG~ptation i t 
could offer to the German people . 
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t n ~-.... - ... ,.....•t • :; r t 
1r d n e r for a unit G 
c ni t bloc of stern rope. peopl of t G 
o.g in t ovi t ="' th t kind to ubv rt th· . 
by th~ war. They had OPen the ex P se of th~ Sov1 t occupation in th• 
enst·rn zone 
w re nds for 
~rrnnn unification on So~iet terms aot nowher . 
made a remarkable recovery from the Yar . It is independent once aaain and 
it already has the poYer to act as a eparate factor, like France or the 
United Kingdom, in the affairs of Europe . It is nOY more than ever immune 
to thP appeal of unification on Soviet terce . 
But es Germany hes changeJ so has Russian policy . That policy has gradually 
be n shifting from German unification on Sovi t terns to Gercan unification 
(IN~~~~ ~~ 
oo " at'l!lftn e lilA . Although this shift has long been in th making it has 
taken the shock of the sudden Russian reversal on th ustrtan treaty and 
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the Soviet invitation to Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscov to bring the 
reality of it home to this country . 
Until these tvo events occurred, our policyon Germany appears to 
have been based on tvo assumptions. The first vas that the Soviet Union 
would never permit German unification except on Soviet terms and the German 
people vould never accept it on Soviet terms. The second was that Chancellor 
Aienauer could keep Western Germany vith Western Europe no matter what else 
happened. Just a year ago, or even a few months ago, the air was filled with 
an incredible optimisism about the German situation vhich stemmed from these 
two assumptions . 
Now, however, the assumptions seem to have been reduced to one; that 
~
Chancellor Adeaauer will not let 
~~~~ 
has been shaken ~ not~rely 
us dovn . The optimism on the German situation 
A 
dispelled. 
The assumption that Chancellor ~denauer will not let us down is a safe 
assumption . I have a deep admiration and respect for the understanding, 
integrity and humanity which characterize the German Prime ltinister. He 
is a great statesman in the finest -----
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that har the Pr 1.a nt' f th . 
Bccaune I do , h wcv r, 1 di turbcd by n Am icy 
ectlllC C n:::m,y v;;:: ~ c . ti , on ~ 
" 
r 
t ,_.I an e: sy 'Q'> Y oUt \'Jitur t 1 n t 
only unf ir to Ad Muer, 
t t t nre t work in Gcrmo:ny d Europe to c 
th 
forces hav hi tori cal rootc t t o lui ck de~ d l nd c turic . h y 
wJ.ll be t1.on long aft r t d 
of this C 
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If our policies · »& 1e eei u e t\ie ne'ti !)1'1 ~ 
0/U- -J. ..k -~tt ~ 
.'::laily UXX:t e!LP '"""Y 
j .. • so) r ~ 5 
~Vl l , _ id~ I 
ft~round one man, tovever great he may be, but 
" 
b::1sis of the historical and other forces thnt are at work."- Ch'3ncellor 
Adenauer has given unparalleled leaderspip to his people and to the 
developnt:.nt of ~stern Europe~m unity . He has done a gre2t deal and 
JWIV~~ ~~ 
he can do mor~ but he c~~ot be expected) to periorm miracles • 
..... 
The do.nger in our present cour-e, as I cee it, is that it ~ 
o-.\~ ~.Jt-~~ 
perpetuates the optimi~tic belie~ th~t Go~~,y i. with us no matter 
1\ " 
what happens , 'that the Germans are now linked ine tric;<>bly with the 
other nations of vTestern Europe. It is true tl'l<'l.t \·Te have moved 
a long way in that direction in the p; st dec· de. Economic bonds .._. 
~ 
~~;:taa5ei•*ltl have been de:ve3>oped under the European ~and 
Steel Community, the EuioPean Payments nion and other coope~ tive 
arrru1geme:nts . The London-Paris accords have provided a fr :ce·:or::C 
for milit~ry integr tion and the dim outlines of political collaboration 
in lectern I:.'urope. 
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obscure the fact that the greatest daw.ge to the free nations J1as been 
largely self-inflicted~ It has resulted fr01., their o\m inner disunity, 
and particulurJ:y the disunity of the ~/estern European region. 
Both gre .. t wars of this century, in the first instance Here atteupted 
suicides on tLe part of \·/estern ~urope . The crit..:.cal danger of co1 . .munism 
came after, not before, tbese massive assaults l-Thich the regiou launched UJ>-
on itself . And only as a ua; is found to cope l-Tith tendcnci(;s of this kind 
\Jill the free nations develop real security against communism and other 
fcr.r1s of totalitarianism. 
~~to..~ ,. 
~ mo t dangerous of theoe tendencies is e.~sociated \-lith the inability 
of modern ~ernany to find a stable place in the cor.mon destiny of ~/estern 
L'Urope. l-11~ explanations hc.ve been offered for tl.is phenomenon. !liS CUI - • 
jpns ba"" aOOt ibahed 1.t to> tire pelt=- "ttl" t!.e e.,, '!!ll£lf" ~ Ylftl the 
-Bri'tiSr1 antt to nume:rous -o~ e~·. (Regardless at \-That door or doors 
responsibility is laid, however , there can be little doubt that tl.is 
failure more than aP.y oti1er has gnawed at the vitals of our civilization 
during the last l~lf contury. 
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r ilur n ed t t C8 
t t it vill not be r pe ted. C ve y vith ur c that th 
nd th reby est bl1 h the conditions for third var in the v t ill ot 
ucceed? 
Th Ru sians are not vithout exten iv r source to make a poverful 
att mpt in that~irection . They can corebinc an offer of G n unific tion 
~ 
on German terms ~ith numerous concessions to th fore of neutrali That 
;.... 
force is strong and is spreading not only in G rmany but on the continent 
of Europe as a vhole . 
In remarks vhich I cade last D cember and appended to the record I 
suggested the possibility thnt 
'the Russians may risk the resurgence of German 
militarism rather than face the inevitable 
prospect of a uni f ied Gcnmany intcgrat d vith 
Western Europe . If thy choose th1 cour e , 
they are ~n a position to 03ke important 
economic, territorial and other conceasions to 
th~ G rmans . Moreover they could vithdrav their 
occupation forces nnd expand the nucl ou of 
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German communist army . Th~y could, in other words, 
offer Germany a unification with real nationalistic 
inducements and ask in return only that the Germans 
separate themselves from Western Europe . 
There are now signs that they may be prepared further . It 
is possible that the Russians will consider abandoning the puppet govern-
ment in East Germany and relaxing their monolithic control over the 
satellite countries of Eastern Europe. These nations lie along the road 
from Berlin to Istanbul, a traditional lin~ of German commercial and 
political interest . A two-prong~ this kind may create almost 
~ 
irresistable pressures in Gemmany towards neutralism, pressures which may 
be beyond even the capacity of Adenauer to control . 
I do not know how far the Russians will go . I believe , however, that 
they will go to great lengths to dissolve the bonds which hold together the 
free nations, from Greece and Turkey to Scandanavia and to reduce the influence 
of the United States on the European continent and in surrounding areas . 
far they go, provided 
They will not succeed, regardless of how/the United States and other 
Western nations do not sit on the sidelines as dispassionate spectators while 
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•h Ru 1 n go bout the e d,. tru tiv ta k . 
diplocat1c off n iv on the t\lo mo t important front 0 By t 1.r 
invitation to Chancellor Adenau r 1 th y have gnine r n dvnntng on 
the que tion of G-rmnn unification . By their udd n shifts on dis nt 
and the Austrian treaty, their long-ti n championing of a BiB Four me tine 
and the play on the neutralist thee , they have touched the deepest emotion 
that affects all urope today, the fear of w~r . 
The need for the Western nations is to act, but to net not eimply 
in reaction to whnt the Soviet Union d< , • 
I 
Too many of our actions in th 
past suggest that they ar~ 
" 
hypnotic spell of Russian policy . 
follow instead of leading . le become so fascinated b~ 
of Soviet policy that we forgPt the potentialities of our o;.-n policy e.nd the 
policies of the western European nations . 
The need is to act , not in reaction to what thP Soviet Union doe , but 
"*i ' 
In th .. co.se of G,..rman unification, 'l."e have paid lip- rvic tothP ide 
but we hav ben dispo~ · think of it prim~rily a a Big Four probl ~. 
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It seems to me that unificaion is also a unique German problem and the 
t~e is over-ripe for the Gercan people as a whole to examine this 
question. I hope therefore that the ~Test German government will give 
serious consideration to convening a conference of •••• ,,. .. ,_.ll'lll'•sra pol:tt;ical 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 37, Folder 65, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
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inspired, although the communists undoubtedly profit by them. They are 
the fears of ordinary Europeans who twice in a generation have had to 
live in the wreckage left by the marching boots. 
German rearmament must proceed according to the formula of the 
London-Paris accords. There must be no retreat from that principle, 
because a disarmed l·iestern Geroany, in the context of the present distri-
but ion of po·..,rer in Europe, is a greater danger to peace than an armed 
Germany. However, the size of the G rman army as stipulated in the London-
Paris accords need not be sacrosanct. If at any t:l-ne, the Soviet Union is pre-
pared to deal realistically •wi th disarmament, then there is no reason why 
the contemplated size of the German army cannot be adjusted d~Nnwards as 
other nations including Russia and the satellites reduce their military 
potential. That approach ~ould put to rest any genuine fears the Russians 
may have of Germany and it will also relieve the uncertainty on the same 
score in Hestern :::urope. 
Finally, there is one great area in which the nations of the western 
Yorld can animust act now instead of waiting placidly for Soviet policies 
to drive wedges between them. T hey can act to fulfill the deeper 
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-~ 
free nations, however im ort;._t~~  in their 
·re of greater Wlity~ -\ 1 tl ~. _ ... 
p• ~
Th.:lt pro:nicc i~lch moe• ~el' t"  ntegrated i i tary defense . 
It meann fl flu:S:::g~f tne~ of the Western European 
nations in the econ mic field, in the po itical field, in al. matters 
in l:hich governments can bett r serve their citizens by 1-rorking 
together r ther tnan separ tely. It means, above all, a -:rillingness 
to face common problems together and to work ;.rith mtiom.l restraint 
in tneir o ution. The need for an approach of tnis kind is urgent 
in fe:;tern Europe; it is ncce.,s~ry thro:.1ghout the \ie.,tern «a:ld; it 
is desir ble •.-1ith all nations tlu~ t If; free to cooper te •·rherever they 
may be on the ~ ~ • 
If we c~ :ma1nt in and perfect that kind of an ap roach, it :r ll 
matt~r far less to us and to others what the Soviet leaders may 
think or do in any given situ tion. For that kind of an approach could 
bring a v st growth in the stren~~ of free ru tions built not only 
on a cilit ry base, but on t.e power of their creative accom lishments 
and the power of their ideals to inspire the fnith of mankind . 
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Speech of Senatot Mike Mansheiti (D., Montana) 
For Release a.. ~~i; ~ - June) . .'~, 1955 
GERMANY AND THE INITIATIVE FOR PEACE 
Mr . President: Several days ago I shared with the Senate some 
reflections on the Big Four Conference which h soon to open in Geneva. 
in substance 1 said that the Fresident and the Secretary of State would be 
able to negotiate with strength and conviction i£ they went into the Geneva 
meetings with the united support of the nation, 
There is no reason why they should not have that suppott. Our 
participation in the Confer ence does not bear a par ty l abel. It is a 
logical development of policies going back many years . They began 
with a Republican Congress and a Democratic Administration. They are 
bearing fruit with a Democratic Congress and a Republican Administration, 
Should the Geneva Conference move the world closer to a desir able 
peace, it will be largely because the sacrifices which all Americans have 
made over the past decade will have helped to lay the groundwork for a 
successful conference . It will be because for ten years this nation has 
worked patiently and cooperatively with other nations to build the conditione 
o! peace . 
No small part of the success, I may add, will be due to the 
distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Some 
weeks ago, he had the wisdom and the initiative to suggest that the moment 
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might be ripe to explore the prospects for relievinc world tensions. He 
had the courage to speak some honest words on the realities of inter-
national life. And in so doing he has rcnwakencd our faith in ourselves 
and in our leadership . He has reminded us of our enormous capacity, 
when we arc united, to deal with the problems of peace no less than with 
those of war, 
In the Austrian Treaty we have had the first evidence that 
conditions of peace may now be coming ir.to being, at least in Europe. 
The Austrian settlement is a tangible indication that the shadow of 
totalitarianism can be made to recede without bombs when the will to 
freedom is unyielding and the strength to sustain it is adequate. Under 
the treaty an advanced position of Russian military power in vrcstern 
Europe will be moved back towards the East in what may be a prelude to 
further withdrawals. 
The Austrian treaty is a compromise as are all bloodless settle-
ments. For our part, the treaty is satisfactory because in the judgment 
of the President, the Secretary of State and the Senate it serves the 
peaceful purposes of the nation and is acceptable to the Austrian people . 
I! the Austrian treaty serves our ends, however, we must face the 
fact that the Russians believe it serves theirs as well . I! they did not, it 
would not have been signed. Viewed in that perspective, the Austrian 
treaty becomes one of a series of highly significant moves which have 
characterized Soviet policy in recent months . Why, we may well ask 
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ourselves, have the Russians renounced their treaties of reciprocal 
assistance with France and the United Kingdom which were directed 
against Germnn militarism? Why have they shown a more amenable 
attitude on disarmament? Why did the leaders of the Soviet Union pay 
homage to Marshall Tito in Belgrade? How are we to explain their 
fabulous welcome for Prime Minister Nehru when just two or three 
years ago he was being denounced as a tool of the western nations? 
Most significant, why have they invited Chancellor Adenauer to establish 
diplomatic relations and commercial agreements between the Soviet Union 
and Western Germany? 
I think it is now generally recognized that each of these actions 
and others elsewhere are part of a tremendous Soviet diplomatic offensive 
which began at least as far back as the death of Stalin in 1953. In August, 
1954, in remarks in the Senate I referred to this drive in these terms: 
There are great stakes involved in the diplomatic struggle ••• 
Here it is not a matter of a few resources, a few strategic 
positions and a reluctant people being seized by the Com-
munists and dragged into their camp. In this diplomatic 
struggle, the willing allegiance or the benevolent neutrality 
of entire nations is involved. 
The communists are striving by a combination of diplomacy 
and economic enticements to drive the free nations further 
and further apart and to draw as many of them as possible 
into their orbit or into an intermediate stage of neutralism. 
What we have seen of the Soviet diplomatic offensive so far, in my 
judgment, is mere prelude. The real drive is now only beginning to unfold. 
It will probe for weaknesses in every part of the structut·e of peace which 
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together with other nations we have built over the past decade and on 
which rests the future of estern civiliz.ation and the security of this 
country. The great test of the Soviet diplomatic drive is coming in 
Germany. 
For many years, it has been apparent that Germany would recover 
and would become once again the decisive power in Europe, the pivot on 
which the questions o£ war or peace and freedom or totalitarianism would 
turn. In 1949, I visited Germany and reported to the House Foreign 
A!fairs Committee that 
Although Germany is at the present time in a very weak 
position with two separate governments ••• it is potentially 
the strongest nation in Western Europe •.• Germany is the 
big prize,,. 
Even in those days the Soviet Union was attempting to draw the whole 
o£ Germany away from Western Europe . 1he Soviet Union had already 
recognized that unification was the one great temptation it could o££er to 
the German people. The Russian c££orts then were based on German uni-
£\cation on Soviet terms. Their demands were !or a united Germany that 
would !it into the Communist bloc o£ Eastern Europe. The people of West 
Germany were immunized against Soviet demands of that kind to subvert 
them . They were exhausted by the war. They had seen the excesses of 
the Soviet occupation in the eastern zone which had driven millions of 
refugees into the west. And they were protected by the Allied armies of 
occupation as evidenced by the success of the Bertin airlift. The Russian 
demands for German unification on Soviet terms got nowhere. 
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The situation now has changed. Western Germany has made a 
remarkable recovery from the war. It is independent once again and it 
already has the power to act as a separate factor, like France or the 
United Kingdom, in the aftairs of Europe. It is now more than ever 
immune to the appeal of unification on Soviet terms. 
But as Germany has changed, so has Russian policy. That policy 
has gradually been shifting from German unification on Soviet terms to 
German unification on terms more acceptable to the Germans . Although 
this shift has long been in the making it has taken the shock of the sudden 
Russian reversal on the Austrian treaty and the Soviet invitation to 
Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscow to bring the reality of it home to 
this country. 
Until these two events occurred, our policy on Germany appears 
to have been based on two assumptions. The first was that the Soviet Union 
would never permit German unification except on Soviet terms and the 
German people would never accept it on Soviet terms. The second was 
that Chancellor Adenauer could keep Western Germany with Western Europe 
no matter what else happened. Just a year ago, or even a few months ago, 
the air was filled with an incredible optimism about the German situation 
which stemmed from these two assumptions. 
Now, however, the assumptions seem to have been reduced to one: 
that Chancellor Adenauer will not let us down. The unwarranted optimism 
on the German situation has been shaken even if it has not been entirely 
dispelled. 
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The assumption that Chancellor Adenauer will not let ue down is 
a safe assumption. I have a deep admiration and respect for the under-
atanding, integrity and humanity which characterize the Gcrm:ln Prime 
Minister. He is a crcat statesman in the finest traditions of \f'cstcrn 
Europe. He knows, perhaps as few other men do, how vital it is that 
Germany remain linked with the western nations . 
Chancellor Adenauer will not let us down . The full faith which 
President Eisenhower expressed in him a few weeks ago was not mis-
placed. I know that I speak the thoughts of many other members of the 
Senate who are acquainted with Adenauer when I say that I share the 
President' s faith. 
Because I do, however, I am disturbed by an American policy 
respecting Germany which is allowed to rest in so many essentials on 
his shoulders alone. It is not only unfair to Adenauer, it is a dangerous 
way of dealing with the tremendous forces that arc at work in Germany 
and Europe today. Those forces have historical roots that go back 
decades and centuries. They will be in operation long after the Chancellor 
and every member of this Chamber have gone. 
If our policies on Germany are to be effective, they must not be 
built solely around one man, however great he may be, but largely on 
the basis of the historical and other forces that arc at work in the situation. 
Chancellor Adenauer has given unparalleled leadership to his people and to 
the development of Western European unity. He has done ;\ great deal ann 
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he can do more, but he cannot be expected, nor should he be asked to 
perform m iracles. 
The danger in our present course, as I see it, is that it perpetuates 
the optimistic and unsound belief that Germany, or at least Western Germany, 
is with us no matter what happens, that the Germans are now linked 
inextricably with the other nations of Western Europe. It is true that we 
have moved a long way in that direction in the past decade . Economic 
bonds have been developed under the European Coal and Steel Community, 
the European Payments Union and other cooperative arrangements. The 
London-Paris accords have provided a framewor k for military integration 
and the dim outlines of political collaboration in Western Europe. 
These measures , however important they may be, constitute a 
promise that Germany will remain with the weste r n nations. They are not 
a guarantee. 
Twice in this century, our civilization has skir ted the edge of 
doom because the western nations assumed that the western world would 
hold together largely of its own accord. Twice our heritage has been 
tossed recklessly into the fires of war because of unwarranted optimism 
and sheer political inertia on that score . Both conflicts which began 
within Western Europe spread great damage in that r egion but both 
reached out to engulf this nation in their tragedy . 
Communism fed on these conflagrations. After the wars had 
burned themselves out, the Communists tore down nations and ideals 
l 
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which had been severely weakened by the conflicts. That is the destructive 
role which communism occupies in the contemporary world and we must 
not lose sight of it. By the same token, however, it is essential not to 
permit this destructiveness to obscure the fact that the greatest damage 
to the free nations has been largely se\i-inflicted. It has resulted from 
their own inner disunity, and particularly the disunity of the Western 
European region. 
Both great wars of this century, in the first instance were attempted 
suicides on the part of Western Europe. The critical danger of communism 
came after, not before, these massive assaults which the region launched 
upon itscli. And only as a way is found to cope with tendencies of this 
kind will the free nations develop real security against communism and 
other forms of totalitarianism. 
Let us face the fact that the most dangerous of these tendencies is 
associated with the inability of modern Germany to find a stable place in 
the common destiny of Western Europe. Many explanations have been 
offered for this phenomenon. Regardless at what door or doors responsi-
bility is laid, however, there can be little doubt that this failure more 
than any other has gnawed at the vitals of our civilization during the last 
hal! century. 
The failure need not be repeated a third time. But can we 
say now that it will not be repeated? Can we say with assurance that the 
Soviet drive to destroy the developing integration of Germany anc Western 
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Europe and thereby establish the conditions for a third war in the west will 
not succeed? 
The Russians are not without extensive resources to make a powerful 
attempt in that direction. They can combine an offer of German unification 
on German nationalist terms with numerous concessions to the force of 
neutralism. That force is strong and is spreading not only in Germany but 
on the continent of Eur ope as a whole. 
In remarks which I made last December and appended to the record 
I suggested the possibility that 
the Russians may risk the resurgence of German militarism 
rather than face the inevitable prospect of a unified Germany 
integrated with Western Europe. If they choose this course, 
they are in a position to make important economic, territorial 
and other concessions to the Germans. Moreover they could 
withdraw their occupation forces and expand the nucleous of 
German militarism which already exists in the East German 
communist army. They could, in other words, offer Germany 
a unification with r eal nationalistic inducements and ask in 
return only that the Germans separate themselves from 
Western Europe. 
There are now signs that they may be prepared to go even further. 
It is possible that the Russians will consider abandoning the puppet 
government in East Germany and relaxing their monolithic control over 
the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. These nations lie along the 
road from Berlin to Istanbul, a traditional line of German commercial 
and political interest. A two-pronged diplomatic drive of this kind may 
create almost irresistable pressures in Germany towards neutralism, 
pressures which may be beyond even the capacity of Adenauer to control. 
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I do not know how far the Russians will go. 1 believe, however, 
that they will go to great lengths to dissolve the bonds which hold together 
the free nations, !rom Greece and Turkey to Scandinavia ond to reduce the 
influence of the United States on the European continent ond in sur:-ounding 
areas. 
They will not succeed, regardless of how far they go, provided the 
United States and other ,. estern nations do not sit on U1e sidelines as 
dispassionate spectators while the Russians go about these destructive 
tasks . As it is now, they hold the diplomatic o££cnsive on the two most 
important fronts in Europe . By their invitation to Chancellor Adenauer, 
they have gained a real advantage on the question of German unification. 
By their sudden shifts on disarmaments and the Austrian treaty, their 
long-time championing of a Big Four meeting and the play on the neutralist 
theme, they have touched the deepest emotion that affects all Europe today, 
the fear of war . 
The need for the Western nations is to act, but to act not simply 
in reaction to what the Soviet Union does; too many of our actions in the 
past suggest that they are performed under the hypnotic spell of Russian 
policy . We follow instead of leading. We become so fascinated by the 
enigmatic twists of Soviet policy that we forget the potentialities of our 
own policy and the policies of the western European nations. 
The need is to act, not in reaction to what the Soviet Union does, 
but to act because it is right and desirable to do so. 
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In the case of German unification, we have paid lip-service to the 
idea but we have been disposed to think of it primarily as a Big Four 
problem. It seems to me that unification is also a unique German problem 
and the time is over-ripe for the German people as a whole to examine 
this question. I hope therefore that the West German government will 
give serious consideration to convening a conference of political, labor 
religious and commercial leaders from all Germany, both East and West 
to consider the problems of unification. After all, it is the Germans 
themselves who must live together in peace in a unified country and it is 
they who must be satisfied with the political conditions which will make 
that possible. 
With respect to the appeal of peace in Europe, I think that the 
President by curbing warlike talk in his own Administration and by his 
public statements in the field of atomic energy has made an important 
contribution in clarifying to the world the pacific intentions of this country. 
There is one matter , however, which requires special consideration insofar 
as it applies to Europe. That is the problem of German rearmament. In 
the London- Paris accords, 'Hestern Europe has accepted the necessity for 
German rearmament. We would be closing our eyes to reality, however, 
if we believe that it has been accepted other than with fear and uncertainty 
in every country in that region, including Western Germany. The fear 
and uncertainty are not communist-inspired, although the communists 
undoubtedly profit by them . They are the fears of ordinary Europeans who 
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twice in a generation have had to live in the wreckage left by the m arching 
boots. 
German r earmament must proceed according to tho formula of the 
London- P aris a ccordo . There must be no retreat !rom that principle, 
because a disarmed Y'es tern Germany, in the conte~t of the present 
distribution of power in Europe, is a greater danger to peace than an 
armed Germany. However, the size o! the German army as stipulated in 
the London -Faria accords need not be sacrosanct. I£ at any time , the 
Soviet Union is prepared to deal realistically with disarmament, then 
there is no reason why the contemplated size of the German army cannot 
be adjusted downwards as other nations including Russia and the satellites 
reduce their military potential. That approach would put to rest any 
genuine fears the Russians may have of Germany and it will also r elieve 
the uncertainty on the same score in Western Europe. 
Finally, there is one great area in which the nations of the western 
world can and mus t act now instead of waiting placidly for Soviet policies 
to drive wedges between them, They can act to fulfill the deeper promise 
of the London-Paris accords. The real meaning of those agreements is 
not simply the addition of 12 German divisions to the defenses of the free 
nations, however important that might be. The real meaning lies in their 
promise of greater unity among the free nations. 
That promise means more than integrated military defense. It 
means a drawing together of the Western European nation• in the economic 
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field, in the political field, in all matters in which governments can better 
serve their citizens by working together rather than separately. It means , 
above all, a willingness to face common problems together and to work 
with national restraint in their solution . The need for an appl:"o2.ch of this 
kind is urgent in Vlestcrn Europe; it is necessary throughout the wester n 
world; it is desirable with all nations free to cooperate wherever they may 
be on the globe. 
If we can maintain and perfect that kind o£ an approach, it will 
matter far less to us and to others what the Soviet leacl.ers may think or 
do in any given situation. For that kind of an approach could bring a 
vast gr owth in the strength of free nations built not only on a military base, 
but on the power of their creative accomplishments and the power of their 
ideals to inspire the faith of ::nankind. 
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